This paper provides a simple reduced-form framework for analyzing merger decisions in the presence of asymmetric information about firm types, building on Shapiro's (1986) oligopoly model with asymmetric information about marginal costs. We employ this framework to examine what types of firms are likely to be involved in mergers. While we give sufficient conditions under which only low-type firms merge, as a lemons rationale would suggest, we also argue that these conditions will often be violated in practice. Finally, our analysis shows how signaling considerations affect merger decisions.
Introduction
In spite of the paramount role that mergers play in the process of restructuring …rms and markets, 1 a number of interesting theoretical questions have received scarce attention. For instance, little is known about the kinds of …rms that are likely to be involved in a merger, even though a large body of research provides reasons why mergers might occur, including synergies, market power, market discipline, etc. (see, e.g., Andrade et al. 2001, 103 ). Should we expect mergers mostly between ine¢ cient …rms? Or between e¢ -cient …rms? Or, more generally, how does the market environment determine what kind of …rms are likely to merge? At …rst glance, one might expect that mergers involve relatively ine¢ cient …rms: Since ine¢ cient …rms realize low stand-alone pro…ts, they have little to lose from a merger. Other things equal, they should therefore be more likely to consent to a merger. This line of argument is supported by an important paper by Hansen (1987) , who considers the choice of exchange medium-that is, whether a transaction should be paid using cash or stock. He argues that, with two-sided asymmetric information about …rm values, a double lemons problem (Akerlof 1970) emerges: "With cash o¤ers, and when the target has proprietary information on the state of its assets, a "lemons"problem arises: the target will sell only when its value is less than the o¤er made. [...] Allowing the acquiring …rm to have proprietary information on its own value sets up a double lemons problem in that the acquiring …rm will not o¤er stock when the target seriously underestimates the value of the o¤er [...] ." (Hansen 1987, 76) This paper investigates the limitations of the lemons rationale in the con-text of mergers under two-sided asymmetric information. More speci…cally, we provide a simple reduced-form framework for studying merger decisions in an oligopoly setting where …rms may have private information about their types. Building on Shapiro's (1986) analysis of Cournot oligopoly with asymmetric information about marginal costs c i , we develop a two-stage merger game. In stage 1, before product-market competition takes place, two out of N 2 …rms are matched, whose types z i = c i ; i = 1; :::; N , are private knowledge. Observing their own types and given their beliefs about the other …rms'types, these two …rms can either consent to a merger or reject it. A merger takes place if and only if both …rms consent. The merger decisions of both …rms become publicly known. In particular, when a merger fails to take place, it is known which party, if any, consented to the merger. This information can be used by all parties, including those not involved in the merger, to update their beliefs about types. In case of a merger, the merged …rm's pro…ts are distributed to the constituent …rms, using stock or cash payments. The distribution of pro…ts is the outcome of some mechanism that may depend on the types of …rms. Consenting to a merger means consenting to this particular mechanism. In stage 2 of the game, the remaining …rms compete under asymmetric information about marginal costs in the Cournot market.
We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the two-stage game. In doing so, it is instructive to proceed in three steps. In a …rst step, we ignore asymmetric information altogether, asking merely what types of …rms consent to a merger under perfect information. Clearly, mergers will only arise if merger returns, de…ned as the di¤erence between post-merger pro…ts and stand-alone pro…ts, are positive for both …rms. We want to emphasize that, even in this simple setting, it is less than obvious that mergers will typically involve low-type …rms:
(i) Even though …rm i's stand-alone pro…ts are increasing in own type z i , merger returns are not necessarily decreasing in own type. To see this, suppose, quite naturally, that an e¢ cient …rm i will also contribute 4 to higher joint pro…ts in the event of a merger. If the owners of …rm i bene…t from these higher pro…ts of the joint entity-for instance, because they hold shares in the new …rm-then high types may, in fact, be more likely to consent to a merger than low types.
(ii) Even if the stand-alone pro…t e¤ect dominates, so that higher types do face lower merger returns, this does not imply that mergers necessarily involve low-type …rms. Rather, as we illustrate below, under a set of reasonable assumptions, …rms need to be relatively similar to make sure that both …rms bene…t from the merger.
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In a second step, we allow for asymmetric information in stage 1 when …rms take merger decisions, but we sustain our assumption of perfect information in stage 2 when …rms compete in the product market. In this setting, the properties of the merger-returns function from the perfect information case translate directly into properties of the equilibrium under two-sided asymmetric information, provided that …rm types are uncorrelated. For instance, if merger returns are decreasing in own type, a two-sided lemons equilibrium emerges, where only low types below a certain cut-o¤ value (if any) consent to the merger.
3 If merger returns are increasing rather than decreasing, this result is reversed, and a two-sided peaches equilibrium emerges, where only high types above a certain cut-o¤ value consent. We show that there may also be so-called lemons-and-peaches equilibria where low-type …rms merge with high-type …rms.
4
In a third step, we relax all simplifying informational assumptions, allowing for asymmetric information in both stages. In this setting, merger 2 Another caveat to the idea that ine¢ cient …rms are most likely to merge has been explored in the context of vertical mergers. Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) show that, under quite natural assumptions, more e¢ cient …rms are more likely to integrate vertically.
3 Note, however, that this structure may break down with (positively) correlated types:
If high types believe that the other …rms are also likely to be of a high type, then they will be more likely to consent to a merger if they expect higher pro…ts in the event of a merger or lower pro…ts in the absence of a merger. 4 Again, these equilibrium structures may break down if types are correlated.
5 decisions carry an informational value which depends on the qualitative properties of the strategies. When …rms are expected to play cut-o¤ strategies with only low types consenting to a merger, then signaling considerations make parties more reluctant to consent to a merger: In the event that the other party rejects the merger, then having consented will signal a low type to competitors. They will therefore expect the consenting …rm to produce a low output in the product market and act more aggressively (i.e., choose higher outputs) themselves. To avoid this unfavorable outcome, at least types who are almost indi¤erent between merging and not merging in the absence of signaling may want to refrain from consenting. In contrast, if …rms are expected to play cut-o¤ strategies with only high types (rather than low types) consenting to a merger, the previous signaling result is reversed: Then …rms may announce a merger to create the impression of being a high type. This paper contributes to the literature on mergers under asymmetric information. Our analysis is perhaps most closely related to Hviid and Prendergast (1993) , who study the signaling e¤ect of an unsuccessful merger proposal in a Cournot duopoly, assuming both one-sided asymmetric information about the target's type and take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers. These authors argue that the information transmission e¤ect of merger rejection extends to the case of two-sided asymmetric information, but they do not provide a formal analysis. Our paper extends the analysis to an oligopoly setting with N 2 …rms and two-sided asymmetric information, abstracting from the details of the negotiation process. A key di¤erence to Hviid and Prendergast (1993) is our …nding that consenting to a rejected merger does not necessarily convey bad news about the pro…tability of the consenting …rm.
A related strand of the literature analyzes mergers from a mechanism design perspective. The bulk of this literature focuses on revenue-maximizing mechanisms, assuming that the stand-alone pro…ts of …rms are known.
5 Notable exceptions are Brusco et al. (2007) and Gärtner and Schmutzler (2006) , who allow for private information about stand-alone pro…ts. An important insight of these papers is that, with private information about stand-alone pro…ts, it is impossible to …nd either e¢ cient or regret-free merger mechanisms, except for very restrictive settings. 6 It thus seems natural to assume that in practice merger decisions are not necessarily based on e¢ cient merger mechanisms. Our reduced-form setting accounts for this by allowing for arbitrary (potentially ine¢ cient) mechanisms determining the pro…t sharing rule and transfer payments. We deliberately chose the simplest possible setting where merger negotiations are not modeled explicitly to increase the transparency of our analysis. Without having to worry about the details of the negotiation process, we can identify what determines the set of merging …rms for general classes of merger mechanisms. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the analytical framework. Section 3 analyzes the full information benchmark. Section 4 considers the case with asymmetric information in stage 1 and full revelation in stage 2. Section 5 examines the signaling case with asymmetric information about …rm types in both stages. Section 6 discusses some limitations and extensions. Section 7 concludes.
Analytical Framework
We consider an adapted version of Shapiro's (1986) Cournot oligopoly model with private information about marginal costs. The key di¤erence to Shapiro is that, in our model, endogenous merger decisions precede product market competition. More speci…cally, we consider a two-stage game where, initially, there are N 2 suppliers of a homogenous good. Each …rm i = 1; :::; N is characterized by its privately known type z i 2 [z i ; z i ]. Throughout the 6 E¢ cient mechanisms ensure that mergers occur if and only if the pro…ts of the merged entitity exceed the sum of pro…ts of the merging …rms ex post. Regret-free mechanisms guarantee for each of the merging …rms that, ex post, their pro…ts exceed their stand-alone pro…ts.
7 analysis, we suppose that the type of …rm i is the negative of marginal cost, i.e., z i c i . We assume that …rm types z = (z 1 ; :::; z N ) are distributed according to a commonly known cumulative distribution function F (z). We denote the derived distribution of the other …rms'types as F i (z i j z i ). This distribution re ‡ects …rm i's interim beliefs about the types of competitors, after revelation of its own type, but before merger decisions have been made.
Even though this speci…c model is helpful for concreteness, the following considerations also pertain to more general oligopoly models. Except for the arguments in Section 5, which rely on the strategic-substitutes property of the Cournot model, nothing of substance depends on the particular formulation.
Stage 1: Merger Decisions
In stage 1, two …rms denoted by i = 1; 2 are matched to decide about a possible merger. Having observed their own type z i and given their belief F i (z i j z i ) about the types of the other …rms, z i , they simultaneously announce whether they are willing to merge. 7 The decision of …rm i is represented by a variable s i such that s i = 1 if it consents to the merger and s i = 0 if it rejects it. The …rms' merger decisions are summarized by the vector s = (s 1 ; s 2 ); which is publicly observable. We impose the following natural assumption on the type of the merged entity:
Assumption 1 The type of the merged entity is a non-decreasing function z M (z 1 ; z 2 ) of the types of the constituent parts.
The function z M ( ) re ‡ects the relevant merger technology. We do not specify its properties except that we suppose that a merged entity is (weakly) more e¢ cient the more e¢ cient its constituent parts. Further, we shall assume that, if a merger occurs, the merged …rm indexed by M not only knows its own type z M , but also the types of the constituent …rms (z 1 ; z 2 ). 
Stage 2: Product Market Competition
Denote the number of …rms remaining after merger decisions have been made as n. In stage 2, these …rms compete à la Cournot in the product market. Let p(X) denote the inverse demand function, where X = P n i=1 x i is the sum of individual outputs. Then, if the output vector is given by x = (x 1 ; :::; x n ); …rm i's pro…t is
When …rms take their output decisions, they know their own type z i and the merger decisions s from stage 1, such that …rm i's strategy in stage 2 is a function x i = x i (z i ; s). Conditional on the available information, each …rm forms beliefs F i (z i j z i ; s). At this stage, we do not yet specify how beliefs are derived. The expected stage-2 pro…ts of a …rm i that is not part of a merged entity, given the merger announcements s from stage 1 and its output
where x i (z i ; s) (x 1 (z 1 ; s); :::; x i 1 (z i 1 ; s); x i+1 (z i+1 ; s); :::; x n (z n ; s)) denotes the vector of the other …rms'outputs as a function of their types z i and the announcements s from stage 1. Moreover, recall that we assumed that the merged entity i = M not only knows its type z M , but also the types of both constituent …rms (z 1 ; z 2 ). Thus, the expected stage-2 pro…ts of the merged entity, given the merger announcements s = (1;1), are Z
We write x i (z i ; s) for i 6 = M and x M (z 1 ; z 2 ) to denote the Cournot equilibrium outputs corresponding to beliefs F i (z i j z i ; s) for i 6 = M and
9 These outputs satisfy the sequential rationality conditions
where the equilibrium outputs of …rms not part of the merged entity are denoted as x M (z M ). For future reference, it is useful to introduce the following notation:
De…nition 1 (stage-2 pro…ts) The expected equilibrium pro…ts of (i) a …rm i that is not part of a merged entity are given by
(ii) the merged …rm M are given by
where i (z 1 ; z 2 ) 2 [0; 1] denotes …rm i's share of the merged …rm's pro…ts and t i (z 1 ; z 2 ) indicates a cash transfer received (t i 0) or paid (t i < 0) by …rm i:
Note that, according to De…nition 1, expected stage-2 pro…ts are denoted by i ( ) ; whereas ex-post pro…ts are denoted by i ( ). Part (iii) of De…ni-tion 1 needs some explanation. While both the expected stand-alone pro…ts 9 For notational ease, we suppress the dependence of outputs on beliefs in x i (z i ; s) and
i and the expected pro…ts of the merged entity M depend exclusively on the properties of product market competition and the beliefs about the competitors' types, the pro…ts of the constituent …rms M i in the event of a merger also depend on the pro…t sharing rule i ; which splits the merged entity's pro…ts into the pro…t shares of the constituent …rms, and possible cash payments t i between the constituent …rms.
Our reduced-form speci…cation is general enough to account for several possibilities. In the simplest case, the merger decision might assign a …xed share to each …rm, irrespective of types, and abstract from cash payments. More generally, however, the combination of i and t i could be interpreted as the outcome of an arbitrary mechanism assigning pro…ts to the constituent …rms.
10 In any case, consenting to a merger also means consenting to a combination of i and t i :
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
We now characterize the properties that a set of strategies s i (z i ); x i (z i ; s); and x M (z 1 ; z 2 ), as well as beliefs F i (z i j z i ; s) and F M (z M j z 1 ; z 2 ) must satisfy to be part of an equilibrium. Let B i B i (s i ) fz i js i (z i ) = 1g denote the set of types z i for which …rm i consents to a merger. Further, let P[B j j z i ] denote the probability that player j consents to a merger. Then, the expected merger returns for …rm i with type z i , when its belief about the distribution of z j is given by F i (z j j z i ) and only types z j 2 B j consent to a merger, is given by
Intuitively, (7) states that the expected returns to consenting to a merger are given by the di¤erence between the expected pro…ts when consenting (the …rst two terms) and rejecting the merger (the last two terms). The matched …rm j accepts the merger with probability P[B j j z i ] and rejects it with probability 1 P [B j j z i ] ; giving rise to four di¤erent possible outcomes with (generally) di¤erent expected pro…ts. It is important to note that all but the …rst term correspond to pro…ts in the absence of a merger; they di¤er only with respect to the …rm (if any) that consented to the merger. Di¤erences between the integrals in the second, third and fourth term are thus exclusively the result of di¤erences in updated beliefs about types resulting from di¤erent merger announcements.
The expected merger returns given in (7) are well-de…ned no matter how players arrive at the beliefs used for calculating i and
However, we shall think of them as obeying standard consistency requirements as follows.
De…nition 2 (PBE) A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the Merger Game is a set of strategies s i (z i ); x i (z i ; s); and x M (z 1 ; z 2 ); with i 6 = M; as well as posterior beliefs F i (z i j z i ; s) and F M (z M j z 1 ; z 2 ); such that, (i) outputs x i (z i ; s) and x M (z 1 ; z 2 ) in stage 2 are given by the Cournot equilibrium quantities corresponding to posterior beliefs F i (z i j z i ; s) and
(ii) merger decisions s i (z i ) in stage 1 are optimal for the given posterior beliefs and the corresponding outputs, i.e.,
(iii) posterior beliefs F i (z i j z i ; s) and F M (z M j z 1 ; z 2 ) are derived from the prior distribution F i (z i j z i ) and equilibrium strategies using Bayes' rule (when applicable). The probabilities P[B j j z i ] used to calculate G i (z i ; B j ; F i ) are derived from the requirement that player i has interim beliefs F i (z j j z i ) and expects each type j to follow his strategy s j (z j ).
We now characterize the properties of the equilibrium step-by-step, starting with two special cases.
Full Information
In a …rst step, we consider the full information benchmark where all types are common knowledge. In this case, the equilibrium pro…ts of a …rm i not participating in the merged entity can be written as i (z i ; z i ); whereas the pro…ts of the merged entity can be written as M (z M ; z M ). Hence, the pro…ts of …rm i participating in a merger are given by
We introduce the following de…nition of merger returns:
De…nition 3 (merger returns) Under full information, …rm i's merger returns are given by
Using (10), di¤erentiating merger returns with respect to own type yields
Inspection of (11) indicates that a marginal increase in own type a¤ects …rm i's merger returns through four quantities:
(i) the pro…t share i ;
(ii) the pro…ts of the merged entity M ;
(iii) the cash transfer t i ; and (iv) the stand-alone pro…ts i .
By de…nition, the partial derivative of stand-alone pro…ts i with respect to own type is non-negative: In the Cournot model …rms with lower marginal costs earn higher pro…ts. At …rst glance, this suggests a lemons problem: As better …rms have more to lose from consenting to a merger, they are reluctant to consent. Yet, taking the remaining e¤ects into account, this observation is not su¢ cient to guarantee that merger returns are non-increasing in own type. Because of Assumption 1 and the fact that the pro…ts of the merged …rm M must be increasing in z M , total merger pro…ts M are non-decreasing in own type. It is quite natural to expect that the mechanism, as captured by i and t i , rewards high-type …rms by letting them bene…t from the increase in M that they generate, so that M i should be increasing in z i . If so, it is not clear that merger returns are decreasing in types: While high types forego higher stand-alone pro…ts than low types, they may also earn greater pro…ts as part of the merged entity.
It is easy to understand, however, under which circumstances the e¤ect on stand-alone pro…ts dominates, so that merger returns are decreasing in own type. For instance, if neither the type of the merged entity nor the components of the mechanism, i and t i , depend substantially on types, then merger returns will be decreasing in own type.
Finally, note that, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the perfect information game, merger decisionsŝ i satisfy the following condition:
That is, …rms consent to a merger if and only if their merger returns are (weakly) positive. It is well known that, in the linear Cournot model, merger returns can only be positive for both …rms (i.e., g i ( ) 0; i = 1; 2) if the merger leads to a su¢ ciently strong rationalization e¤ect (see Salant et al. 1983 and Barros 1998) or to synergies (Farrell and Shapiro 1990 ). In our setting, this implies that a merger will only occur if z M (z 1 ; z 2 ) is su¢ -ciently large. Otherwise, there will be no merger in the SPE.
Under full information, the properties of the merger-returns function translate straightforwardly into properties of the set of merging types. In the Appendix, we use this to illustrate that, even if, in spite of our earlier reservations, merger returns are decreasing in own types, so that low types are more eager to participate in mergers, it is by no means clear that mergers involve low types. Rather, under a set of reasonable assumptions, …rms need to be relatively similar to make sure that both …rms bene…t from the merger. This leads to the second important caveat to the idea that ine¢ cient …rms are most likely to merge. Even in settings where ine¢ cient …rms have the strongest incentives to join, under full information, this does not necessarily lead to equilibria where only the least e¢ cient …rms merge. The equilibrium requirement that both parties must consent may imply, for instance, that equilibria involve relatively similar …rms, irrespective of their e¢ ciency.
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Let us now assume that …rm types are revealed after merger decisions, but before …rms compete in the product market. This has two immediate implications:
(i) Merger decisions s = (s 1 ; s 2 ) must be taken under uncertainty;
(ii) In spite of ex-ante uncertainty about …rm types, merger decisions s = (s 1 ; s 2 ) cannot serve as signaling devices.
The assumption that types are revealed before …rms compete in the product market is a convenient simpli…cation. It allows us to characterize some key properties of the Bayesian equilibrium under two-sided asymmetric information without having to worry about signaling, as beliefs are not updated by assumption.
11
In this setting, the second stage game corresponds exactly to the full information case. It is important to note that, in stage 2, it is irrelevant why a merger did not occur in stage 1: Given the type vector z, the pro…ts of all …rms i = 1; :::; n are independent of whether …rm 1 and/or 2 rejected the merger. That is, in the general formulation of expected second-stage pro…ts (2), the dependence of posterior beliefs on merger decisions is super ‡uous. As a result, Cournot outputs in the absence of a merger are independent of which of the two …rms, if any, consented to the merger. In (7), therefore, the second and fourth term cancel out, so that expected merger returns are given by
11 We will consider the e¤ects of signaling in Section 5.
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where the expectation is taken over the types of all other …rms z i . Inspection of (13) indicates that, if …rm types are correlated, a marginal increase in own type z i a¤ects merger returns not only through the four quantities mentioned above-the combination of pro…t share i and cash payment t i ; the pro…ts of the merged entity M ; and the stand-alone pro…ts i -but also through the probability P [B j j z i ] of …rm j consenting to the merger, and the belief F i (z i j z i ; z j 2 B j (s j )) about the other …rms' types z i : Under the plausible assumption that types are positively correlated, higher types put more weight on the possibility that the other …rms have high types. As a result, there is a third potential reason why, contrary to the initial intuition, higher types might be more likely to merge: They expect to be facing better competitors if they stay alone, and they expect to be matched with a better partner in the event of a merger.
We now introduce the following terminology:
This de…nition is closely related to the familiar single-crossing property of incremental returns (Milgrom and Shannon 1994) . 12 Next, we characterize the Bayesian equilibrium of the merger game with revelation of types before product market competition. The equilibrium is given by s R i (z i ); x R i (z i ; s) and x R M (z i ; z j ; s), where the superscript indicates that types are revealed before product market competition. We …rst give a cut-o¤ condition in terms of expected merger returns, and then consider more primitive conditions on merger returns without asymmetric information. Lemma 1 (cut-o¤ property) Suppose G i (z i ; B j ; F i ) satis…es SSC in z i for all B j Z j , i = 1; 2, j 6 = i, with beliefs F i = F i (z i j z i ; z j 2 B j (s j )) and players j adhering to strategy s j (z j ). Then every Bayesian Equilibrium (s 1 ; s 2 ) in pure strategies with P [B i (s i )] > 0 for i = 1; 2 satis…es the cut-o¤-property, that is, there are cut-o¤ values z i 2 Z i such that
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for Lemma 1 is as follows: SSC states that, for any distribution F i (z i j z i ; z j 2 B j (s j )), if some type z i consents to a merger, so will any lower type z 0 i < z i . The proof then shows that this property of best responses translates into the cut-o¤ property of the equilibrium. One might be concerned because the assumptions in Lemma 1 refer to endogenous equilibrium beliefs. However, as we now show, the SSC condition of Lemma 1 often holds for arbitrary beliefs and thus, by implication, for equilibrium beliefs.
Using Lemma 1, the next result follows immediately:
Proposition 1 (two-sided lemons) Suppose that, under full information, …rm i's merger returns g i (z i ; z i ) are monotone decreasing in own type z i for i = 1; 2: Then, if …rm types are independently distributed, every Bayesian Equilibrium satis…es the cut-o¤ property.
Proof. Since types are independently distributed by assumption, expected merger returns are monotone decreasing by (13) for arbitrary beliefs, and the result follows directly from Lemma 1.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is straightforward: If higher types face lower merger returns for arbitrary realizations of competitor types, then they must gain less in expectation for arbitrary beliefs, provided that types are independently distributed. This is what we call a two-sided lemons equilibrium. The result crucially relies on the assumption that …rm types are independently distributed: It avoids the possibility that better …rms opt for a merger simply because they expect the other …rms to have higher types.
Note the e¤ect of introducing uncertainty on the qualitative properties of the equilibrium. As we illustrate in the Appendix, if merger returns are monotone decreasing in own type (and a set of reasonable assumptions hold), only relatively similar types will merge (if any) in the absence of uncertainty. In contrast, if (expected) merger returns are monotone decreasing in own type under uncertainty, the fact that high types have a smaller propensity to merge is re ‡ected in the cut-o¤ property of the equilibrium.
14 Next, we consider two simple implications of Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Suppose that …rm types are independently distributed. Then, (i) if …rm i's merger returns g i (z i ; z i ) are monotone increasing in z i for i = 1; 2; every Bayesian Equilibrium satis…es a reversed cut-o¤ property where only high types consent (two-sided peaches).
(ii) if g 1 (z 1 ; z 1 ) is monotone decreasing in z 1 and g 2 (z 2 ; z 2 ) is monotone increasing in z 2 ; there exist z
and s 2 (z 2 ) = 1 i¤ z 2 z H 2 (lemons-and-peaches).
Proof. Follows from rede…ning types and applying Proposition 1. Corollary 1 re ‡ects our …rst argument that the lemons rationale may be misleading in the context of mergers. As argued above, even if a high type foregoes higher stand-alone pro…ts than a low type …rm when entering a merger, it may also gain more from the merger, as it performs better in the merged entity. If the latter e¤ect dominates, a …rm's merger returns are increasing in own type, and a merger is only pro…table for high types ("peaches"). As a result, we obtain equilibria where only high-type …rms (two-sided peaches) or at least some high-type …rms (lemons-and-peaches) consent to the merger.
Signaling
We …nally discuss the case where merger decisions are taken under uncertainty and types are not revealed before …rms compete in the product market. In this setting, a …rm's merger decision may carry an informational value, because this decision allows other …rms to make inferences about its type in situations where no merger occurs because the other …rm declines. That is, a …rm's merger decision serves as a signaling device. Formally, observing s will allow …rm i to update its prior belief F i (z i j z i ) about the other …rms' types to F i (z i j z i ; s). The payo¤s are therefore given by (7).
We now characterize the PBE in the presence of signaling. Let us …rst note that the game always has a pooling equilibrium where no types are willing to merge. 15 This result is very intuitive: If both …rms believe that the other …rm will not consent to the merger-no matter what its type is-it is a (weakly) best response not to consent, and beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
The preceding analysis suggests, however, that there may also be (partially) separating equilibria. Recall that in settings where …rm types are revealed before product market competition and merger returns (as de…ned in (13)) satisfy SSC , cut-o¤ equilibria arise (Lemma 1). Without type revelation in stage 2, a similar result holds, with a single-crossing condition on (7) rather than (13). Let us therefore consider a setting where the game has a cut-o¤ equilibrium. How is the structure of this equilibrium a¤ected by signaling considerations?
To answer this question, consider (7). The second and the fourth term jointly re ‡ect the informational value of …rm i's merger decision to competitors. They highlight that the expected pro…ts of …rm i in the case where both …rms decline may di¤er from the case where only …rm j declines, as …rm i's decision reveals information about its type. In principle, consenting to a merger can signal both high or low type, depending on competitors'beliefs. If merger returns are SSC ; competitors expect low types to merge, so that consenting signals a low type. This immediately implies that signaling considerations provide incentives to decline. Intuitively, if competitors take declining as a sign of strength, they will react by reducing their Cournot outputs, re ‡ecting the strategic-substitutes property of product market competition. In such a setting, signaling considerations will make …rms more reluctant to consent to a merger, leading to lower cut-o¤ values.
Conversely, if merger returns are upwards (rather than downwards) singlecrossing (SSC + ), competitors expect high types to merge, so that consenting signals a high type. In this case, a type who is just indi¤erent between merging and not merging without signaling wants to consent to a merger to signal his strength. Thus, more types will consent to a merger than without signaling, meaning that cut-o¤ values are lower. Our next proposition summarizes these results.
remaining …rms compete in a Cournot market. This is arguably the simplest setting that allows us to study the question of which types of …rms consent to a merger if …rms have private information about both stand-alone and postmerger pro…ts. We now consider a number of limitations and extensions and discuss to what extent the latter are likely to a¤ect the properties of merger returns.
Matching Let us …rst consider stage 1 of the game. Assume that rather than being matched and forced to communicate their merger decisions, …rms can endogenously choose (i) whether they are willing to enter merger negotiations, and (ii) with whom they want to negotiate. While this is clearly a very di¤erent (and perhaps more realistic) institutional setting, the reduced-form representation of expected merger returns will not be a¤ected, provided that …rms are unable to fully reveal their types before the merger decision, and F i (z i j z i ) is interpreted to represent the residual uncertainty after merger negotiations. 16 As a result, the qualitative results of our analysis remain una¤ected.
Product Market Competition Consider now another form of product market competition in stage 2 of the game. More speci…cally, let x i ; i = 1; :::; n; represent prices rather than quantities and assume that …rms produce horizontally di¤erentiated goods. In this case, competition in the product market is in strategic complements rather than substitutes, so that the signaling e¤ect characterized in Proposition 2 is reversed. Intuitively, if competitors take declining as a sign of strength (i.e., low cost), they will now react by reducing their prices (rather than reducing their quantities), re ‡ect-ing the strategic-complements property of product market competition. As a result, the pro…t di¤erential associated with signaling a low type must be positive, so that the cut-o¤ value must be higher (rather than lower) than in the reference case without signaling.
Properties of Merger Mechanisms
Our reduced-form analysis suggests that merger decisions crucially rely on the properties of the merger-returns function. In particular, we …nd that it is decisive whether merger returns are increasing or decreasing in own type. In part, this depends on the properties of the merger mechanism determining i and t i that we take as exogenous. It would therefore be desirable to explicitly characterize the properties of merger mechanisms that are associated with decreasing and increasing merger returns, respectively. While this is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clearly an interesting subject for future research.
Principal-Agent Problems Our analysis abstracts from principal-agent problems within …rms by assuming that merger decisions are taken by …rm owners. We are well aware, though, that managers may have a strong impact on merger decisions, and that their interests are likely to diverge from those of …rm owners. 17 By focusing on owner-decisions, we restrict attention to mergers that are conditionally e¢ cient ex ante in the sense that, conditional on i and t i ; they occur if and only if they weakly increase expected pro…ts for both …rms.
Conclusions
This paper provides a simple reduced-form framework for analyzing merger decisions in the presence of asymmetric information about …rm types. We employ this framework to examine what types of …rms are likely to be involved in mergers. We show that the lemons rationale has severe limitations in the context of mergers. It is true that there are circumstances where only low types (if any) consent to a merger, so that a two-sided lemons equilib-rium emerges. There are, however, alternative settings where only high types consent (two-sided peaches equilibrium), and even settings where low types merge with high types (lemons-and-peaches equilibrium). For such alternative equilibria to emerge, it is necessary that the merger-returns function of at least one of the …rms involved in a merger is increasing rather than decreasing in own type, which is perfectly conceivable. An important implication of this insight is that consenting to a merger that gets rejected by the other …rm does not necessarily signal a low type. Our paper sheds new light on the likely pattern of merging …rms when merger mechanisms may be ine¢ cient. A natural extension of our paper would be to explicitly characterize the properties of merger returns for alternative merger mechanisms and pro…t functions. This is an interesting subject for future research.
Condition (i) implies that there is a critical type C j (z i ) of …rm j for which type z i would consent to a merger. Since g i (z i ; z i ) is decreasing in z i and increasing in z j ; j 6 = i; the functions C j (z i ) are increasing in (z 1 ; z 2 )-space for i; j = 1; 2; i 6 = j. For pro…les (z 1 ; z 2 ) to the left of C 2 (z 1 ); …rm 1 consents to the merger; for pro…les (z 1 ; z 2 ) to the right of C 1 (z 2 ) …rm 2 consents: The merger set consists of the intersection of these sets.
Under the symmetry condition (ii), the merger set will either be empty or consist of relatively similar types (see Figure 1) . In particular, for an equilibrium strategy s j , the best reply has the required cut-o¤ structure.
Proof of Proposition 2
(i) By assumption, in the PBE of a game with cut-o¤ values (z 1 ; z 2 ) such that player i = 1; 2 consents i¤ z i z i ; beliefs must be such that any player that has consented to a merger has a lower type than any player that has not. Therefore, players j 6 = i choose lower outputs in product market competition when …rm i has declined the merger, as they expect this …rm to choose a higher output. Thus, the pro…t di¤eren-tial associated with signaling a low type must be negative, so that the cut-o¤ values with signaling must be smaller than in the reference case without signaling.
(ii) By assumption, in the PBE of a game with cut-o¤ values (z 1 ; z 2 ) such that player i = 1; 2 consents i¤ z i z i ; beliefs must be such that any player that has consented has a higher type than any player that has not. Therefore, players j 6 = i choose lower outputs when …rm i has consented. Thus, the pro…t di¤erential associated with signaling a high type must be positive, so that the cut-o¤ values with signaling must be smaller than in the reference case without signaling. 
